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Zcash developers propose separate keys to protect NEAR Intents swaps from quantum risk

Zcash developers are proposing a separate viewing key for every ZEC swap through NEAR Intents. The Zakura design aims to prevent a future quantum computer from linking one exposed refund address to a user’s broader private payment history.

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Zcash developers propose separate keys to protect NEAR Intents swaps from quantum risk

Zcash developers are working on a change intended to limit the damage a future quantum computer could cause to users who swap ZEC through NEAR Intents. The team behind Zakura, a newer software implementation for the Zcash network, has proposed assigning a separate viewing key to every swap made through the cross-chain service.

The proposed design addresses a privacy weakness created when NEAR Intents posts a Zcash refund address on NEAR’s public blockchain. The address allows the service to return unused ZEC if a swap does not use the entire deposit. It is published when the deposit arrives and remains visible even when no refund is ultimately required.

According to CoinDesk, the address does not reveal useful information to conventional computers. However, it is based on public-key mathematics that a sufficiently capable quantum computer could theoretically reverse using Shor’s algorithm. If that happened, an attacker could potentially derive a wallet’s viewing key and connect transactions that are otherwise intended to remain private.

Why the refund address matters

Zcash is designed to conceal payment details, including transaction information and the amounts involved. Its wallets can create multiple addresses that appear unrelated, but those addresses commonly rely on the same viewing key. The viewing key enables a wallet to identify incoming payments and read associated private notes, or memos.

That structure creates a broader exposure if one publicly posted refund address is compromised in the future. An attacker who recovered the related viewing key could potentially connect payments received by the account and inspect their amounts and private notes. The issue would concern transaction privacy rather than direct control of the funds: Zcash uses a separate spending key, which would remain with the user under the proposed design.

Quantum computers capable of carrying out such an attack have not been demonstrated. The source material says the technology is still likely years away, with no firm timetable for when a machine powerful enough to recover these keys might be built. Nevertheless, developers across the cryptocurrency industry are working on safeguards because public blockchain data can remain available for analysis long after it is recorded.

The proposed Zakura approach is to give each ZEC swap through NEAR Intents its own viewing key. If a refund address associated with one transaction were eventually compromised, the attacker would be limited to information connected with that individual swap instead of gaining access to the account’s wider payment history.

Private recovery for large numbers of keys

Using a separate key for every swap would create a practical problem for active users. A wallet that completed hundreds of swaps could accumulate hundreds of keys. Restoring such a wallet from a backup would require checking the Zcash blockchain with each key, potentially creating a substantial scanning task.

Zakura’s proposed solution uses private information retrieval, a technique that lets a wallet query a database without revealing which addresses it is checking. The wallet could use the system to locate refunds while keeping its search details hidden from the database. This is intended to preserve privacy not only in the blockchain record but also during the refund-recovery process.

The design keeps spending keys under the user’s control and focuses the change on the viewing keys associated with swaps. Zakura says the feature would be open source. Software wallets compatible with its libraries, including Vizor, could adopt it within weeks, while hardware wallets would need firmware support before adding the capability.

The timetable would put the proposed protection ahead of a January target set by Zcash developers for quantum-resistant payments. The target follows earlier concern about how Zcash should prepare for the possibility of future quantum attacks, although the source material does not say that any such attack is currently possible.

Market picture

Moneyiar market data at 22:03 on October 19, 2026, showed Zcash (ZEC) at $1,141.383946386, up 5.06% over 24 hours but down 5.66% over seven days. NEAR Protocol (NEAR), the network connected with NEAR Intents, was priced at $4.8918261858, rising 2.19% in 24 hours and falling 5.20% over seven days.

For additional market context, Quant (QNT) stood at $194.9254069311 at the same Moneyiar timestamp, with a 5.15% 24-hour increase and a 14.17% seven-day decline. Compound (COMP) was $21.5137509536 at 22:04, up 3.05% over 24 hours and down 8.83% over seven days. These price movements provide market context only; the proposed privacy change does not establish a forecast for any of the assets.

Source CoinDesk Written by Moneyiar based on reporting from the cited source and Moneyiar market data.
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